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I. INTRODUCTION
A Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law will meet during the first nine days of December 2003 to consider a Draft
Text on Choice of Court Agreements. That text was prepared by an informal
working group in March of 2003, and is the fruit of nearly a decade of
negotiations.' Those negotiations originally sought a rather comprehensive
convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments,
with a preliminary draft convention being prepared in October 1999, and further
revised at the first part of a Diplomatic Conference in June 2001. When it
became clear that some countries, particularly the United States, could not
agree to the convention being considered, negotiations were redirected at a
convention focused on bases of jurisdiction upon which consensus could be
achieved. The result is now a text limited to one basis ofjurisdiction; that is the
consent of the parties.
While the current Draft Text is more limited in its scope and effect than
drafts previously considered, it offers the possibility of both realistic success
*

Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of

Pittsburgh. The author is a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Commission at the Hague Conference on Private International Law charged with negotiating a convention on jurisdiction and the effect of
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters, and was a member of the Working Group session that
produced the Draft Text on Choice of Court Agreements in March 2003. The comments in this article are
those of the author and should not be taken to reflect the position of the U.S. government, or the Hague
Working Group.
1.
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Report on the work of the informal working
group on the judgments project, in particular on the preliminary text achieved at its third meeting - 25-28
March 2003 (June 2003), available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm-pd22e.doc. (last visited Jan. 17, 2004)
[hereinafter Hague Conference].
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in its conclusion and adoption, and a foundation from which to consider
possible future work on multilateral harmonization of jurisdiction and the
enforcement ofjudgments. I will briefly review the substance of the Draft Text
in order to explain its purpose, recognize its limits, and acknowledge issues yet
to be decided. This review supports the conclusion that the Draft Text presents
a workable foundation for a very useful convention.
II. THE DRAFT TEXT RULES
The Draft Text is perhaps most easily understood if one thinks of it as the
litigation counterpart to the New York Arbitration Convention.' Like the New
York Convention, this treaty would establish rules for enforcing private party
agreements regarding the forum for resolution of any resulting disputes, and
rules for recognizing and enforcing the decisions issued by the chosen forum.
Thus, a Hague Choice of Court Convention would serve the business world by
providing for choice of court agreements, a measure of predictability similar to
that now provided for arbitration agreements under the New York Arbitration
Convention. Exclusive choice of court agreements in business-to-business
contracts would be honored by courts in contracting states, and the resulting
judgments would be enforced.
Article 1(1) begins the process of defining the scope of the convention by
providing that it "shall apply to agreements on the choice of court concluded in
civil or commercial matters." This sets the basic focus of the convention on
one basis of jurisdiction: choice of the court by the parties involved. Article
1(2) takes a carve-out approach to the scope issue by listing types of contracts
to which the convention does not apply. Article 1(3) is similar in approach,
listing exclusions from Convention coverage in terms of subject matter of the
dispute. Of these exclusions, the most important is that found in Article
l(2)(a), which limits the Convention to business-to-business choice of court
agreements by excluding coverage of consumer contracts.3 This is done by
adopting language very close to that found in Article 2(a) of the U.N. Sales
Convention,4 stating that the Convention shall not apply to agreements in which
at least one party is a consumer ("acting primarily for personal, family or
household purposes").

2.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
3.
Hague Conference, supranote 1, at 1(2)(b) (explaining that the other type-of-contract exclusion
from scope is found in art. 1(2)(b), which excludes "individual or collective contracts of employment.").
4.
U.S. Ratification of 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (Mar. 2, 1987); see also Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 19 LL.M. 668 (1980).
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The Draft Text deals with both exclusive and non-exclusive choice of
court clauses. Article 2(1)(b) creates a presumption that if you list only one
court or country, the clause is exclusive. This is important to enforcement of
the agreement, because only exclusive choice of court clauses are entitled to
Convention enforcement under Articles 4 and 5. This changes in the Article 7
rules, however, where judgments emanating from courts taking jurisdiction on
the basis of any valid choice of court agreement (exclusive or non-exclusive)
are entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Convention.
The Draft Text creates three basic rules upon which the operation of the
Convention turns. They are:
1) The court chosen by the parties in an exclusive choice of court
agreement has jurisdiction;
2) If an exclusive choice of court agreement exists, a court not
chosen by the parties does not have jurisdiction, and shall decline to
hear the case; and
3) A judgment resulting from jurisdiction exercised in accordance
with a choice of court agreement (exclusive or non-exclusive) shall be
recognized and enforced in the courts of other Contracting States.
Article 4(1) sets out the basic rule that the court chosen by the parties in
an exclusive choice of court clause "shall have jurisdiction:"
If the parties have agreed in an exclusive choice of court agreement
that a court or the courts of a Contracting State shall have jurisdiction
to settle any dispute which has arisen or may arise in connection with
a particular legal relationship, that court or the courts of that Contracting State shall have jurisdiction, unless the court finds that the
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.
This rule applies only to international business-to-business contracts
containing choice of court agreements. Thus, Article 4(2) provides that the rule
does not apply "if all the parties are habitually resident" in the Contracting
State in which a case is brought, and they have "agreed that a court or courts of
that same Contracting State shall have jurisdiction to determine the dispute."
There is no explicit rule providing whether or not a court which is chosen
in an exclusive choice of court agreement may decline to hear the case based
on discretionary grounds such as forum non conveniens. The Secretariat's
Report states that one of the Convention's "three aims" is that "the chosen court
has to hear the case."5 This, however, is inconsistent with the explicit language
5.

Hague Conference, supra note 1, at 6.
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of Article 5 that allows a court not chosen in such an agreement to hear the case
if "the chosen court" has "declined jurisdiction."6 Thus, the explicit language
of Article 5(c) would suggest that such discretionary doctrines are not affected
by the Draft Text.7
Article 4(3) does make clear that Convention rules govern only in
personam jurisdiction, and that private parties cannot create subject matter
jurisdiction that does not otherwise exist in a national legal system. Thus, for
example, parties cannot agree to submit a dispute to a specialized court when
only the local courts of general jurisdiction have subject matter jurisdiction
over the type of dispute in question within the chosen legal system.
While Article 4 serves to tell the chosen court how to respond to an
exclusive choice of court agreement, Article 5 provides the rule applicable in
courts that are not chosen. Thus, a court in a Contracting State that is not
selected in an exclusive choice of court agreement "shall decline jurisdiction
or suspend proceedings." The only exceptions to this rule occur when:
(a) that court finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed;
(b) the parties are habitually resident in that Contracting State and
all other elements relevant to the dispute and the relationship of the
parties, other than the choice of court agreement, are connected with
that Contracting State; or
(c) the court chosen has declined jurisdiction. 8
The Draft Text includes no general public policy exception to enforcement
of a choice of court agreement. This is consistent with the structure of the New
York Arbitration Convention, which provides no public policy exception in its
Article II obligation of Contracting States to recognize arbitration agreements,
but does have an Article V public policy exception to the Article II obligation
to recognize and enforce the resulting arbitral awards.9
The second exception to deference by a derogated court to the chosen
court is the counterpart to the Article 4(2) domestic case rule for chosen courts.
Thus, Article 5(b) allows a court not chosen to determine that the case is a local
matter within the Contracting State in which that court sits, and thereby refuse

6.
Id.at18.
7.
One might argue that the chosen court's Article 4(1) authority to determine that "the agreement
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed," or the domestic case exception under Article
4(2), constitute explicit Convention rules by which the chosen court could "decline jurisdiction." This runs
counter to the explicit language of the text, however, since these are exceptions to jurisdiction under the
Convention and not authority to decline jurisdiction that otherwise exists.
8.
Hague Conference, supra note 1, at 18.
9.
See New York Convention, supra note 2, at 2519 - 20.
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to respect the choice of the parties in the choice of court agreement. This can
occur, however, only if "all other elements relevant to the dispute and the
relationship of the parties, other than the choice of court agreement, are
connected with that Contracting State."
Article 7 provides the basic rule on recognition and enforcement of a
judgment issued by a court of a Contracting State, and for which jurisdiction
was founded on a choice of court agreement. Such a judgment "shall be"
recognized and enforced. Unlike the language of Articles 4 and 5, the terms of
Article 7 do not limit the recognition and enforcement obligation to judgments
resulting from exclusive choice of court agreements, but authorize recognition
and enforcement under the Convention of judgments resulting from all choice
of court agreements. The definitional provisions of Article 2(1) operate to
mean that Contracting States are obligated to enforce judgments resulting from
both exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court agreements. This result is
intentional. Rules obligating courts to respect non-exclusive choice of court
agreements would have been much more complex and difficult at the Article 4
and 5 stage.
While the scope of the general recognition and enforcement rule is broader
than the general jurisdictional rule, it is also subject to more exceptions. Here,
there arises, again, a basic issue of definition and structure. Article 7(1)
provides an exhaustive list ° of grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement if the judgment is based on an exclusive choice of court agreement.
Article 7(2) then provides additional grounds for refusal if the judgment is
based on "a choice of court agreement other than an exclusive choice of court
agreement." This reflects the fact that the general rule on recognition and
enforcement found in Article 7(1) applies beyond the types of cases emanating
from Article 4 jurisdiction under the Convention.
The list in Article 7(1) includes grounds for non-recognition that should
seem familiar to anyone accustomed to the Brussels Convention and Regulation, the New York Arbitration Convention, or the U.S. Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act. A court in a Contracting State may refuse
recognition or enforcement if:
(a) the court addressed finds that the choice of court agreement was
null and void;
(b) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent
document, including the essential elements of the claim, was not

10.
Hague Conference, supra note 1, at 20 (explaining that recognition or enforcement may be
refused "only" if one of the listed grounds is satisfied. Note, however, that courts "may" refuse recognition
and enforcement under this provision, meaning that non-recognition is not mandatory if one of the listed
grounds is satisfied).

350

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 10:345

notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to
enable him to arrange for his defense;
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter
of procedure;
[(d) the judgment results from proceedings incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedure of the State addressed;] or
(e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible
with the public policy of the State addressed."
The Article 7(2) grounds for non-recognition represent an acknowledgment that non-exclusive choice of court agreements may produce parallel
proceedings resulting in inconsistent judgments. Thus, non-recognition may be
allowed where contrary obligations exist as a result of parallel proceedings.
While the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 7 allow nonrecognition, they do so only in limited circumstances. Paragraph (3) follows by
strengthening the effect of the original judgment, providing that the court asked
to recognize and enforce a judgment cannot review the merits of the decision
in the originating court.
The Draft Text changes the result in earlier drafts on the issue of validity
of a choice of court agreement. There was the belief within the Working Group
that incorporation of a choice of law rule in the text would tip the balance on
things like shrink-wrap contracts. Thus, there is no provision allowing a
contract to be held void, for example, if its terms are "manifestly unjust," and
there is no choice of law rule. What we have is the rule that a choice of court
clause shall be enforced unless the clause is null and void. This approach was
taken from Article 1(2) of the New York convention, and a court will apply its
own rules on validity. This rule is found in 3 places: Article 4 (for the court
chosen), Article 5 (for courts not chosen), and Article 7 (for the recognizing
court). In each instance, the court has to decide the validity of the agreement
under the law it deems to be applicable. Thus, while "formal" validity of a
clause is governed by Article 3, substantive validity is left to the court seized
in each of the three possible situations.
1m. CONCLUSION

With over 130 Contracting States, the New York Convention has had a
significant impact on dispute resolution practice in international transactions.
The existence of a system that supports the enforcement of both agreements to
arbitrate and the resulting arbitral awards adds predictability and efficiency that
cause business parties often to favor arbitration over litigation. The availability
of a convention that would do for litigation what the New York Convention has
11.

Id.
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done for arbitration would serve to place litigation and arbitration on a more
equal footing in global commerce, thus allowing parties to transnational
transactions the opportunity to select the form of dispute resolution based on
its individual merits.
The March 2003 Draft Text on Choice of Court Agreements offers a
framework for the negotiation of a workable Hague Convention. Such a
convention would both present a valuable opportunity to place litigation on a
more equal status with arbitration for international private dispute resolution,
and serve as a foundation for discussion and development of further progress
in the realm of cross-border jurisdictional practice in national courts. Thus, it
seems that the Draft Text can bring the focus of jurisdiction and judgments
work at the Hague Conference into the realm of the possible, building on the
consensus that does exist for a convention dealing with jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement ofjudgments. It offers a valuable opportunity that
brings with it few, if any, disadvantages.

